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Source: Car Handshake and participating dealerships. Year, make and model must match to appear here; trims and specifications can differ. Listings do not establish vehicle condition or recall repair status.
Canadian owner complaints
Coverage, without substituted US totals.
Canadian complaint totals are not available in Recheck’s current dataset. This does not mean there are no complaints.
Canadian recalls come from Transport Canada and efficiency ratings from NRCan. US complaints and bulletins are optional context below; they do not establish Canadian applicability.
Canadian archive snapshot, including historical or superseded records.
High Voltage
Issue:
This recall is for certain vehicles that had a battery energy control module (BECM) replaced during service.
On certain vehicles, the replacement battery energy control module may not have been programmed correctly. As a result, the state of charge coul…
Read the complete source summary
Issue:
This recall is for certain vehicles that had a battery energy control module (BECM) replaced during service.
On certain vehicles, the replacement battery energy control module may not have been programmed correctly. As a result, the state of charge could display incorrectly, so a person may not recognize the low state of charge, which could cause a loss of power to the wheels. Additionally, this could lead to the high-voltage battery overheating after repeated fast charging.
Safety Risk:
A loss of power to the wheels could increase the risk of a crash. A battery that overheats can create a fire risk.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and advise you to take your vehicle to a dealership to update the battery energy control module software.
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the left and right rear quarter window glass trims may not have been secured properly. As a result, the trim(s) could loosen and separate from the vehicle.
Safety Risk:
Trim that detaches from the vehicle could create a road h…
Read the complete source summary
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the left and right rear quarter window glass trims may not have been secured properly. As a result, the trim(s) could loosen and separate from the vehicle.
Safety Risk:
Trim that detaches from the vehicle could create a road hazard for others and increase the risk of a crash.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and advise you to take your vehicle to a dealership to inspect and, if necessary, replace the rear quarter window glass trims.
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the differential pinion shaft could break and cause a loss of power to the wheels. This could also cause the vehicle to move when the transmission is in Park, if the parking brake is not used.
Note: This recall only affects rear-wh…
Read the complete source summary
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the differential pinion shaft could break and cause a loss of power to the wheels. This could also cause the vehicle to move when the transmission is in Park, if the parking brake is not used.
Note: This recall only affects rear-wheel drive models.
Safety Risk:
A loss of power to the wheels could increase the risk of a crash. Additionally, a parked vehicle that moves suddenly could create the risk of an injury or a crash.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and advise you to take your vehicle to a dealership to repair or replace the rear differential assembly, as necessary.
Issue:
Under certain conditions, the electronic door latches could stay locked after the driver and/or front passenger exit the vehicle. As a result, you may not be able to open the doors from the outside, or an occupant that's unable to use the inside door h…
Read the complete source summary
Issue:
Under certain conditions, the electronic door latches could stay locked after the driver and/or front passenger exit the vehicle. As a result, you may not be able to open the doors from the outside, or an occupant that's unable to use the inside door handle(s) may not be able to exit the vehicle on their own.
Safety Risk:
Doors that can't be opened from the outside could delay emergency responders from entering the vehicle. This could also slow certain occupants from exiting the vehicle in an emergency. Both issues could increase the risk of injury.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and advise you to take your vehicle to a dealership to update the powertrain control module (PCM) and secondary on-board diagnostic control module (SOBDMC) software.
Issue:
On certain vehicles, a software problem could cause the rearview camera image not to display or to freeze when the transmission is shifted into reverse.
Safety Risk:
A rearview camera image that doesn't display correctly could reduce a driver's abi…
Read the complete source summary
Issue:
On certain vehicles, a software problem could cause the rearview camera image not to display or to freeze when the transmission is shifted into reverse.
Safety Risk:
A rearview camera image that doesn't display correctly could reduce a driver's ability to see behind the vehicle while backing up. This could increase the risk of a crash.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and send a wireless over-the-air software update to eligible vehicles to update the SYNC software. Alternatively, you may schedule an appointment to have the update performed at a Ford dealership.
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the windshield wiper motor may not have been manufactured properly. As a result, the motor could fail and cause the windshield wipers not to work.
Note: This recall replaces Transport Canada recall no. 2024-461. Vehicles that were…
Read the complete source summary
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the windshield wiper motor may not have been manufactured properly. As a result, the motor could fail and cause the windshield wipers not to work.
Note: This recall replaces Transport Canada recall no. 2024-461. Vehicles that were repaired under that recall don't require this repair.
Safety Risk:
Windshield wipers that don't work could reduce visibility and increase the risk of a crash.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and advise you to take your vehicle to a dealership to inspect and, if necessary, replace the windshield wiper motor.
This recall was replaced by Transport Canada recall no. 2024-692.
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the windshield wiper motor may not have been manufactured properly. As a result, the motor could fail and cause the windshield wipers not to work.
Safety Risk:…
Read the complete source summary
This recall was replaced by Transport Canada recall no. 2024-692.
Issue:
On certain vehicles, the windshield wiper motor may not have been manufactured properly. As a result, the motor could fail and cause the windshield wipers not to work.
Safety Risk:
Windshield wipers that don't work could reduce visibility and increase the risk of a crash.
Corrective Actions:
Ford will notify owners by mail and advise you to take your vehicle to a dealership to inspect and, if necessary, replace the windshield wiper motor.
Model-year recalls do not establish repair completion.
Confirm open recalls with the manufacturer and ask a dealer whether the repairs are complete. Recheck’s VIN decoder identifies the vehicle; it does not provide recall repair status.
Use official test estimates with your own distance and prices.
Scenario estimate, not a live price quote or total cost of ownership. Uses the selected source configuration’s combined test consumption. Weather, speed, battery condition, charging losses, taxes, maintenance, depreciation and insurance can change actual cost. Plug-in hybrids are excluded from this simple calculator because fuel and electricity use depend on charging behaviour. Your inputs stay in your browser.
Coverage boundary: Canadian archive snapshot Exact normalized make/model/year safety matches. Efficiency retains explicitly named source configurations; spelling/configuration differences may exclude records. US complaint counts do not establish Canadian experience or the probability of a defect.
Accident history, current mechanical condition, ownership, liens, individual recall applicability, repair completion and battery health are not established by this model-year report. No failure rate or reliability score is calculated from raw complaint totals.
Specifications & Efficiency
Official source configurations. No trim is assumed.
Source configuration
Fuel / powertrain
Combined efficiency
Range
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range A1
B
20.3 kWh/100 km
397 km
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range (LFP) A1
B
20.7 kWh/100 km
402 km
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range AWD A1
B
22.6 kWh/100 km
360 km
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range AWD (LFP) A1
B
22.6 kWh/100 km
370 km
Mustang Mach-E Extended Range A1
B
21.1 kWh/100 km
500 km
Mustang Mach-E Extended Range AWD A1
B
22.9 kWh/100 km
467 km
Mustang Mach-E California Route 1 AWD A1
B
21.3 kWh/100 km
502 km
Mustang Mach-E GT Performance Edition A1
B
25.6 kWh/100 km
418 km
Official test estimates vary with configuration, driving and weather. Fuel codes are retained as published; US and Canadian test measures are shown in their source units. Plug-in hybrid source ranges and operating modes are shown separately; they are not added together.
More from the official configuration records
Figures belong to each source configuration. Test conditions and charging assumptions apply; tailpipe emissions exclude fuel and electricity production. No missing specifications are inferred.
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range · A1 — source specification details
Vehicle class
Sport utility vehicle: Small
Motor output
198 kW
City electricity consumption
19.0 kWh/100 km
Highway electricity consumption
21.9 kWh/100 km
Source recharge time
8.1 h
Tailpipe CO₂ emissions
0 g/km
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range (LFP) · A1 — source specification details
Vehicle class
Sport utility vehicle: Small
Motor output
198 kW
City electricity consumption
19.6 kWh/100 km
Highway electricity consumption
22.0 kWh/100 km
Source recharge time
7.4 h
Tailpipe CO₂ emissions
0 g/km
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range AWD · A1 — source specification details
Vehicle class
Sport utility vehicle: Small
Motor output
198 kW
City electricity consumption
21.1 kWh/100 km
Highway electricity consumption
24.3 kWh/100 km
Source recharge time
8 h
Tailpipe CO₂ emissions
0 g/km
Mustang Mach-E Standard Range AWD (LFP) · A1 — source specification details
Vehicle class
Sport utility vehicle: Small
Motor output
232 kW
City electricity consumption
21.5 kWh/100 km
Highway electricity consumption
24.0 kWh/100 km
Source recharge time
7.4 h
Tailpipe CO₂ emissions
0 g/km
Mustang Mach-E Extended Range · A1 — source specification details
Check the current official Transport Canada register.
Canadian investigation records are not imported into this report. Check the official register for affected vehicles, investigation details and current status; no match or status is implied here.
A research brief for the 2023 Ford Mustang Mach E, built from this report.
Record the VIN, market and exact powertrain. Confirm open recalls and completed remedies with the manufacturer.
Ask for repair documentation for campaign 2026431 (High Voltage). A model-year match does not establish that this VIN is affected.
Ask for repair documentation for campaign 2026368 (Structure). A model-year match does not establish that this VIN is affected.
Ask for repair documentation for campaign 2026317 (Powertrain). A model-year match does not establish that this VIN is affected.
Compare service records with the manufacturer’s schedule and arrange an independent pre-purchase inspection. This checklist is not a diagnosis or an expert inspection.
Optional US contextNHTSA complaints, communications and investigations · not Canadian records
These are US records. Models, equipment, campaigns and driving conditions can differ. Counts are not Canadian complaint totals, verified reviews or reliability ratings.
Reported Problem Categories
US NHTSA complaints for the 2023 Ford Mustang Mach E.
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
53
UNKNOWN OR OTHER
27
FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE
26
POWER TRAIN
24
SERVICE BRAKES
23
US context, not Canadian complaint counts. NHTSA documents known discrepancies in its bulk complaint file. Consumer allegations are not confirmed defects. One complaint can mention several categories. Counts are not failure rates.
Reports Over Time
US complaints by filing month, latest 12 observed months.
25-12
26-01
26-02
26-03
26-04
26-05
26-06
26-07
26-08
26-09
26-10
26-11
A month with no bar is not evidence that no problems occurred. Publication and reporting delays affect totals.
Read chart data
2025-12
1
2026-01
2
2026-02
2
2026-03
2
2026-04
3
2026-05
1
2026-06
2
2026-07
2
2026-08
4
2026-09
4
2026-10
6
2026-11
1
RECHECK EVIDENCE LAB
The mileage lens
Where the available US complaint records fall by reported mileage.
Reported mileage at incident
Matched complaint records
Below 25,000 mi
10
25,000–49,999 mi
1
50,000–99,999 mi
0
100,000–149,999 mi
0
150,000+ mi
0
Missing or excluded mileage
119
11 of 130 matched complaints have positive, usable mileage. Source zero values can represent missing information and are excluded; values above 1.5 million miles are excluded. These are selected allegations with no vehicle-population denominator. The table cannot predict when your vehicle will fail. Mileage is retained in US source miles.
Crash flagged10US complaint allegations
Fire flagged1US complaint allegations
Towed flagged11US complaint allegations
Positive source flags are counted per deduplicated complaint, not verified incidents. Categories and flags can overlap; an unflagged or missing value does not prove an incident did not occur.
Bulletins & Investigations
US official records; applicability in Canada is not established.
190 matched manufacturer communications · 2 matched investigations. Communications are not necessarily recalls or technical service bulletins.
EA25001 · Collisions Involving Ford BlueCruise
On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Engineering Analysis (EA) is being opened to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.
On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25001) to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.
Showing up to 8 communication summaries and 4 investigations. Export coverage: communications received 2020–2026 only. Canadian applicability is not inferred. Consult NHTSA for full records.
Sources & Last Updated
Trace the evidence behind this report.
Transport Canada Vehicle Recalls Database · Original source · Evidence updated Nov 17, 2026
US NHTSA complaints · optional US context only · Original source · Retrieved Nov 17, 2026 · Counts deduplicated by ODI number.